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Abstract
The Department of Energy recently adopted a net profit sharing
system for leasing development rights to offshore petroleum
resources. Proponents of the system claim that it will foster
greater competition for offshore leases, and encourage devel-
opment of small and marginal offshore petroleum deposits.
This paper examines several difficulties inherent in the net
profit sharing system which reduce the probability that these
objectives will be achieved.

FINE TUNING THE NET PROFIT SHARE LEASING SYSTEM
FOR OFFSHORE PETROLEUM RESOURCES
I. Introduction
The Department of Energy recently adopted an innovative system for
leasing development rights to offshore petroleum resources. The system
is based on the concept of net profit sharing (NFS) , and is currently
being used on an experimental basis in all federal sales of offshore
petroleum tracts. Proponents of the }TPS system claim that it will
foster greater competition in offshore lease sales by reducing the
financial burden of front-end payments that arise under the traditional
cash bonus bidding system. Proponents also claim that the NFS system
will encourage development of small and marginal offshore petroleum
deposits.
This paper examines several difficulties inherent in the NFS leas-
ing system which reduce the probability that its objectives can be
achieved. The impact of the NFS system depends on the values assigned
to two critical policy parameters: the profit sharing rate and the
capital recovery factor. As we show below, the desired effect of the
NFS system can easily be reversed if policymakers are not careful in
selecting compatible values for these two parameters. Moreover, param-
eter values that are appropriate for one tract may be inappropriate for
other tracts. Thus, a considerable amount of fine tuning and adjust-
ment is required to match the parameters of the NFS leasing system to
characteristics of individual tracts offered for sale. Below we dis-
cuss the type and extent of fine tuning that is required, and describe
difficulties inherent in administering such a system.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The historical
development of offshore leasing policy in the U.S. leading to adoption
of the NFS system is reviewed briefly in Section 2. The general struc-
ture and specific objectives of the NPS system are described in Section
3. In Section 4 we develop a simplified, heuristic model of the impact
of the NPS system on offshore petroleum leases. The implications of our
analysis for public policy are summarized in the concluding Section 5.
2. Historical Background
Since 1954 the federal government has relied on simple sealed-bid
auctions to award exploration and development rights on offshore petro-
leum tracts. Under the traditional cash bonus bidding system, each
tract is awarded to the highest bidder in exchange for the stated amount
of the bid (i.e., the cash bonus) and a royalty override on subsequent
production, typically one-sixth of gross revenues. The bonus bid is a
simple mechanism for capturing mineral rents that accrue on individual
offshore tracts. In many instances prospective rents have been quite
large, and recently the magnitude of winning bids for individual tracts
has frequently exceeded $100 million.
The size of initial cash outlays required to enter the market for
offshore petroleum leases has led some observers to believe that partici-
pation by small firms has been restricted, and that the degree of com-
petition for tracts would increase under alternative auction procedures
that reduce the magnitude of winning bids. In response to this con-
cern. Congress stipulated in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978 that, subsequent to the Act, at least 20% of all
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offshore tracts be offered under alternative bidding procedures that
rely less heavily on front-end cash bonus payments.
Following Congress's mandate, the Department of Energy recently
implemented several new leasing systems. Of these, the NPS system
represents the most radical departure from earlier procedures. The
NPS system was adopted amid much controversy and strong reservations
have been expressed regarding its structure and method of implementa-
2
tion." It is still too early to judge from actual experience whether
the NPS system has been successful in achieving its stated objectives.
However, it is possible to identify and examine several aspects of the
system that would appear, a priori, to jeopardize its performance.
3. Structure and Objectives of the NPS System
The NPS system eliminates the traditional government royalty inter-
est in offshore oil and gas fields and puts in its place a system of
pajments based on a fixed percentage of the net income earned by off-
shore operators. This percentage is called the profit sharing rate.
Certain deductions from gross revenues are permitted before arriving
at net income subject to profit sharing, the two principal deductions
being based on the levels of operating and investment expenditures.
The treatment of operating expenditures is straightforward; they
are deducted from gross production revenues on a current basis as in-
curred. Deductions based on investment expenditures are somewhat more
complicated. Investment expenditures incurred before production begins
are depreciated and written off, as usual, against the firm's income
for purposes of computing corporate income tax liability. In addition.
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however, these capital expenditures are accumulated in a special capi-
tal account. Once production begins, the operator is permitted to write
off the outstanding balance in the special capital account against cur-
rent income to arrive at net income subject to profit sharing. That
is, exploration and development expenditures can be recovered in their
entirety by the operator before any profit sharing payments are due.
The operator is not directly permitted to recover accrued interest
on the outstanding balance in the special capital account, even though
several years may separate the time of investment expenditures and sub-
sequent production. In lieu of interest, the government permits some
return to invested capital through a device called the capital recovery
factor. If the capital recovery factor is specified to be 2.0, for
example, the operator may deduct from gross revenues twice the amount
of the outstanding balance in the special capital account to arrive at
income subject to profit sharing.
NFS deductions from the special capital account are different than,
but taken in addition to, the usual depreciation deductions allowed by
the corporate income tax code. For purposes of computing corporate
income tax liabilities, investment expenditures are depreciated and
deducted from current income. Current income may be generated either
by production from the field in question or by other activities of the
company. For the purpose of computing profit sharing liabilities, in-
vestment expenditures may be deducted only against income generated by
the field in question (this entails a delay since production does not
start immediately), and once production begins the investment expendi-
tures may be deducted as rapidly as revenues permit, rather than being
depreciated over a specified number of years.
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Offshore leases awarded under the NPS system are still awarded on
the basis of a sealed-bid auction. The applicable profit sharing rate
and capital recovery factor are specified by the government for each
tract prior to the auction. Companies then bid for the tracts in the
customary fashion, except that profit sharing pajnnents will take the
place of royalty payments once production commences.
The objective of the NPS system is twofold. First, by appropriate
manipulation of the profit sharing rate and capital recovery factor,
the government may be able to capture a greater share of available
mineral rents in the form of production-related payments (rather than
in the form of bonus payments) than is possible under a straight pro-
duction royalty scheme. This seems sensible since the royalty is
essentially a flat excise tax that is not based on profits. If the
NPS system is successfully structured to capture a larger share of the
rents in the form of production-related payments, then it follows that
the net present value of each tract (as reckoned by the companies) will
3
decline, as will the magnitude of tendered bids. Thus, the ?IPS system
is intended to be a device for indirectly reducing capital barriers to
entry in the market for offshore tracts. Second, by eliminating royal-
ties, it is hoped that development and production decisions will not be
distorted by the "artificial" royalty component of marginal cost that
in the past may have discouraged production of marginal resources. This
would have the effect of increasing the magnitude of total mineral rents
4
captured by society.
These objectives were summarized by the government in the statement
promulgating the NPS leasing system:
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Congress's perception was that large cash bonus pay-
ments may inhibit competition for OCS leases by pre-
venting smaller independent fir-ns from participating
in OCS development. By design, use of a net profit
share system places greater emphasis on contingency
payments for generating fair returns to the govern-
ment, and thereby less reliance on the initial cash
bonus. Reduction of cash bonus bids constitutes a
primary effect intended under the proposal. The pro-
posal was also intended to result in increased pro-
duction of oil and gas from the OCS, foster develop-
ment of marginal oil and gas fields, increase ef-
fective competition for OCS leases, and free more
funds for exploration in addition to increasing total
revenues to the public.
As we show in the next section, the NPS system may or may not have
the intended effects. The system will succeed in reducing the level of
bonus bids only if the net present value of ?TPS payments is greater
than the net present value of royalties that have been eliminated. The
NPS system will foster the development of marginal fields only if the
chosen capital recovery factor properly compensates the operator for the
cost of invested capital. T-Thether the fiscal parameters of the NPS
system can be properly manipulated to achieve both objectives simultan-
eously seems very much in doubt. The difficulties inherent in this
task are discussed further in the next section.
4. A Heuristic Model of the NPS Leasing System
The economic effects of the NPS system can be analyzed using a
simplified two-period model of an offshore petroleum lease. Although
reliance on a two-period analysis blurs many of the subtler points re-
lated to offshore petroleum development, it has the advantage of clar-
ifying the influence of alternative tax and leasing policies. Conse-
quently, the central features of optimal policy design are brought to
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the fore. The basic features of our simplified model are described
below.
We assume all exploration and development expenditures are incurred
in the first period of the lease's life. All production takes place in
the second period. After the second period, production is terminated
and the lease is abandoned. We use the following notation to describe
the characteristics of the lease:
I = exploration and development expenditures ($)
P = wellhead price of petroleum ($/barrel)
Q = production volume (barrels)
C = production cost ($/barrel)
i = discount rate (%)
r = production royalty rate (%)
t = marginal corporate income tax rate (%)
X = profit sharing rate (%)
f = capital recovery factor
Using this notation, we can characterize the after-tax net present
value of a given lease offered either under the cash bonus bidding
system or the IfPS system. The net present value of the lease offered
under the cash bonus bidding system (i.e., a conventional "royalty
lease") is given by NPV :
(1) I^V^= (,,,).[
(l-r)PQ-CO
.
^j^
This value is the sum of the following terms. In the first period the
company experiences net exploration and development expenses equal to
-8-
-(l-t)I. In the second period the operator receives net income from
production in the amount (l-r)PQ-CO, and incurs a tax liability of
-t[(l-r)PO-CQ].
The net present value of a lease offered under the NPS system (i.e.,
a "profit sharing lease") is given by NPV :
(2) NPV^ = (l-t).[(PQ-CO) • {y3t" ^*^^ "Tm^^-
This value is the sum of the following terms. In the first period the
operator incurs the same net development expenses as before, equal to
-(l-t)I. In the second period the operator receives higher net income
from production (due to elimination of the royalty) in the amount
PO~CQ; but also incurs a net profit sharing liability in the amount
-x(PO-CO-f I) . In addition, the operator incurs a second period tax
liability in the amount -t[PQ-CQ-x(PQ-CQ-f I) J
.
Because the entire history of an actual lease is condensed into
just two periods in our simplified model, some care must be taken in
interpreting certain of the parameters that appear in Equations (1)
and (2). Specifically, the investment cost (I) should be interpreted
as the net present value of a stream of investment expenditures
that usually extend over four or five years. Similarly, the total
production volume (Q) is typically distributed over a large number
of years, commencing at the time that development expenditures have
been completed. Therefore, the term should be thought of as the
"present barrel equivalent" of future production flows, in the manner
p
described by Adelman. The discount factor (1+i) that links the two
periods of our model represents the annual discount rate compounded
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over Che period until production commences (typically four or five
years)
.
The difference in net present values of the two leases is found by
subtracting (2) from (1):
(3) NPV^ - NPV^ = - ^^^^^^^ •[rPQ-x(PQ-CQ)+xfl].
Equation 3 permits a direct comparison of the value of the lease of-
9
fered under the alternative leasing systems:
(4) r;PV^ NPV if and only if x(P-C-fl/Q) — rP.
Objective 1: Reducing Lease Values
Condition (4) implies that the NFS system will succeed in reducing
the value of the lease if and only if net profit sharing receipts ex-
ceed the amount of royalties foregone. It should be clear that for a
given capital recovery factor (f) the value of the two leases will be
equal if and only if an appropriate profit sharing rate (x) is chosen.
The unique rate of profit sharing that equilibrates the values of the
two leases can be determined by solving the equality version of (4)
explicitly for x:
(5) x(f) =
""^
P-C-fI/0
If the }TPS system is to succeed in lowering the net present value of
offshore leases, then a profit sharing rate in excess of the value in
Equation (5) must be adopted. Of course, the range of acceptable profit
sharing rates depends on the stipulated capital recovery factor; the
two parameters cannot be set independently.
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It is also true that for given values of the profit sharing rate
and capital recovery factor, there is a unique development cost that
equilibrates the net present values of the two leases. The equilibrat-
ing unit capital cost (l/Q) is determined by solving the equality ver-
sion of (4) explicitly for I/O (hereafter, I/Q will be denoted by "k"):
(6) k(x,f) = J
• [P(l-r/x) - C].
If the unit development cost for a given tract exceeds k(x,f) , then the
NPV of the profit sharing lease will exceed that of the royalty lease,
in contradiction to the stated objective of the NPS program. The im-
plication is that if the two NPS parameters (x and f) are set uniformly
over all tracts, then the first objective of the NPS system (i.e.,
lowering tract values) may be achieved on low-cost tracts, but probably
not on high cost tracts.
We illustrate these results by plotting the locus of net-present-
value-equilibrating pairs (x,f) for several hypothetical offshore tracts
(see Figure 1). Arbitrarily setting the wellhead price (P) equal to
$1 per barrel (this is a numeraire to which the results are invariant)
and production cost equal to $0.05 per barrel, we focus on three tracts
that vary widely in terms of unit development costs. We have arbitrar-
ily chosen the cases: k = $0.15, $0.30, and $0.45 per barrel. The
results in Figure 1 also reflect the assumption that the royalty rate
applicable to the royalty lease is 1/6, which corresponds to historical
practice.
Figure 1 can be Interpreted in the following way: points lying to
the northwest of any particular locus represent all possible combinations
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FIGURE 1
EFFECT OF NFS FISCAL PARAMETERS
ON THE VALUE OF OFFSHORE TRACTS
Points (x,f) lying northwest (southeast) of a given
locus reduce (increase) the value of the associated
NPS lease, relative to the value of a comparable
royalty lease.
1.0 -
X 0.
01
!0
c
0.6
CO 0.4
>« 0.2
o
lue-equilibrating
cus, k = 0.30
equilibrating
k = 0.15
0.0
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00
capital recovery factor (f)
Note: Calculations are based on the following values.
P = 1.00; C = 0.05; r = 1/6.
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of profit sharing rates and capital recovery factors that will succeed
in reducing the value of the specified NFS lease below the value of a
corresponding royalty lease. For example, if the capital recovery
factor is set at 1.5, then on a low-cost tract (i.e., k = 0.15) the
profit sharing rate must be at least 23% to ensure a reduction in the
net present value of the tract. The profit sharing rate on a high-cost
lease (i.e., k = 0.45) must be at least 60% if the MPS system is to
achieve its first objective. These results are invariant to the firm's
discount rate and marginal income tax rate.
Objective 2: Fostering Development of Marginal Fields
The before-tax net present value (NPV^) of a given tract is given
by:
The after-tax net present value of the same tract can then, by rear-
ranging terms in Equation (2), be written as:
(8) NPV^ = (1-t) • [NPVq - X •
CPQ-CQ-fI)
j^
„ 10
By definition, all marginal tracts obey the property: ^^ = 0.
That is:
Upon inspection of Equation (8), we see that the NPS system will be
neutral regarding development of marginal fields (i.e., NPV^ = if and
only if NPV = 0) if and only if:
P-C-fk < whenever k = (P-C)/(l+i).
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The neutrality condition can be expressed equivalently as:
?-C-[f(P-C)/(l+i)] <_ 0,
which implies that the capital recovery factor must be set to satisfy:
(10) f2.1+i-
This result accords with simple intuition. It says that the capital
recovery factor must at least equal the operator's discount factor.
If it does not, the NPS system does not permit the operator to recover
his full cost of invested capital, and the after-tax net present value
of a marginal field will be negative.
The effect of alternative capital recovery factors on the after-
tax net present value of a marginal field is illustrated in Figure 2,
for selected values of the discount rate and net profit sharing rate.
We report results based on the assumption that i = 45%. Recall that
an interval of four to five years typically separates production from
exploration and development expenditures. An annual discount rate of
8% compounded for five years yields a discount rate of approximately
45%, so this is probably a realistic rate to consider. As shown in
Figure 2, the after-tax net present value of a marginal tract decreases
linearly (from a starting point of zero) as the capital recovery factor
is reduced below the operator's discount factor. Because the NFS
system does not subsidize losses (i.e., payments flow only from the
producer to the government) , the NFS system will not encourage the
development of submarginal fields, nor increase the value of marginal
fields. However, if applied carelessly, the NFS system can easily dis-
courage development of marginal or nearly marginal fields.
-14-
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FIGURE 2:
NPV OF A MARGINAL FIELD, AS A FUNCTION OF "f
FOR GIVEN VALUES OF x.
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Achieving Both Objectives Simultaneously
We have so far identified certain constraints on fiscal parameters
of the NFS system that must be satisfied if this new leasing program
is to succeed in lowering tract values. We have identified a separate
constraint that must be satisfied if the fJPS system is to avoid dis-
couraging development of marginal fields. In this section we juxtapose
both constraints to identify the range of NFS fiscal parameters that
will succeed in meeting both objectives simultaneously.
Figure 3 presents illustrative results based on the three hypotheti-
cal tracts considered earlier (i.e., low, medium, and high development
cost). The set of NFS parameters (f,x) that satisfy the first objec-
tive, for a given tract, is as before indicated by the set of points
lying northwest of the corresponding value-equilibrating locus. The
set of NFS parameters that satisfy the second objective is indicated
by the set of points lying to the right of the vertical line. The
size and location of the Intersection of these two sets will vary
considerably, depending on the magnitude of development and operating
costs and the length of the pre-production delay. Regarding the high-
development-cost tract (k = .45) depicted in Figure 3, the range of
acceptable NFS parameters is quite restricted; the profit sharing rate
must be at least 60%, while the capital recovery factor can vary only
between 1.45 and (at most) 1.75. The acceptable region would shrink
even further if the magnitude of operating costs were increased (C >
.05), or if the development period were extended (i > .45). In fact,
if the development period were eight years (which implies i = .85) it
is impossible to find any pair of NFS parameters (x,f) that accomplishes
CO
CO
c
1.0
0.8
0.6
u
2 0.4
CO
i1
0.2
0.0
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FIGURE 3:
VALUES OF THE NFS FISCAL PARAMETERS THAT
ACHIEVE BOTH POLICY OBJECTIVES
Points (x,f) lying northwest (southeast) of a given
locus reduce (increase) the value of the associated
offshore tract, relative to the value of a comparable
royalty tract. Points (x,f) lying west of the vertical
line discourage development of marginal tracts.
minimum "f" for development of marginal fields
1^
lue-equilib rating
cus, k = 0.30
=-equilibrating
locus, k = 0. 15
±
1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00
capital recovery factor (f)
Note: Calculations are based on the following values,
P = 1.00; C = 0.05; i = 0.45; r = 1/6.
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the objectives of Che NFS program. On lower-development-cost tracts,
parameter selection is much easier. By setting a very high capital
recovery factor (f > 2.0), and a moderately high profit sharing rate
(x > .30), administrators can be reasonably assured that the dual
objectives of the NFS system will be achieved on low-developraent-cost
tracts (k =.15). The problem here is to know, a priori, which are the
low-development-cost tracts. This is especially important since the
NFS system would backfire if the values f = 2.0 and x = .30 were mis-
takenly applied to a high-cost tract.
Unfortunately, there is no single setting for the NFS parameters
Chat can be applied indiscriminately to all tracts and yield the desired
results. Figure 4 illustrates the extent of fine tuning chat may be
required. Two tracts are depicted in the figure. The first tract is
inherently less valuable and probably smaller than the second tract.
It can be developed rapidly, and the development program is not capital
intensive. The second tract is more capital intensive and requires a
much longer development period. The sets of NFS parameter values appro-
priate to the respective tracts are indicated by the shaded areas. The
two sets are disjoint. None of the parameter settings appropriate for
the first tract can safely be applied to the second tract, and vice versa.
5. Implications for Leasing Policy
Our main conclusion is that a considerable amount of fine tuning
and adjustment may be required to suit the parameters of the NFS leasing
system to characteristics of individual tracts offered for sale. Some
generalizations are possible. For example, it appears from our numeri-
cal results that a minimum profit sharing rate of approximately 30%
-18-
FIGURE 4:
FEASIBLE NPS PARAMETER SETS
FOR DISSIMILAR OFFSHORE TRACTS
Each shaded region represents all combinations of
the NPS fiscal parameters (x,f) appropriate for
the associated tract.
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capital recovery factor (f)
Calculations are based on the following values.
Tract 1: P=1.00; C=0.25; k=0.35; i=0.26; r=l/6.
Tract 2: P=1.00; C=0.05; k=0.30; 1=0.71; r=l/6.
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must be applied across the board if the NFS system is to succeed in
reducing the value of offshore tracts. This finding is consistent with
the government's current stipulation that "the net profit share rate
shall not be less than 30%" on any tract offered under the NFS leasing
system. However, on relatively high-cost tracts, this will hardly
suffice. Our results indicate that a minimum rate of 60% is probably
necessary to ensure the success of the tJPS program whenever development
costs constitute a significant fraction of total revenues.
In actuality, the magnitude of unit development costs varies greatly
across tracts, even within a fairly homogeneous geological area. Con-
sequently, the task facing administrators of the NFS leasing system is
not easy. For example, within one recent sale of seventy leases in the
western Gulf of Mexico (Sale 62), exploration and development costs,
expressed as a fraction of the value of underlying resources, were esti-
mated to vary (across tracts) between 0.14 and 3.41, with an average
13
value of 0.66 and standard deviation of 0.58. These numbers correspond
to the value of our parameter "k" , which we varied only between 0.15
and 0.45. Thus, the critical importance of tailoring the fiscal para-
meters of the JTFS system to suit characteristics of individual tracts
is probably understated in the present study.
The need to tailor parameters of the NFS leasing system to char-
acteristics of individual tracts was recognized early in the develop-
ment of the ?rPS system. An internal study conducted by the Department
14
of Energy concluded that:
Ceteris paribus, system performance depends on the
relative magnitude of exploration costs versus de-
velopment and production costs. Experimentation
-20-
with costs representative of a particular sale
region will always be necessary to "fine tune" a
system and determine the parameters that generate
"optimal" lease development and production be-
havior.
This concern was carried over into the Department of Energy's statement
that accompanied final promulgation of MPS regulations:
In theory, tailoring capital recovery factors to
individual tracts operates to serve the purposes
of the regulation more closely .... The capital
recovery factor is unique to each lease and
selected on the basis of cost and resource ex-
pectations .
Unfortunately, the idea of fine tuning the fiscal parameters of the
MPS system has not carried over into actual practice. Uniform profit
sharing rates and capital recovery factors are routinely applied to all
leases offered in offshore lease sales. For example, all leases of-
fered under the NPS system in Sale 62 were offered subject to a capital
recovery factor of 1.5 and profit sharing rate of 30%, despite the
considerable variation in unit development costs that we have noted.
Although it is undoubtedly easier to administer the NPS leasing system
on a uniform basis, this practice would appear to jeopardize the suc-
cess of the program.
There are several reasons why the government might be reluctant to
administer the NPS leasing system more closely. The most obvious, per-
haps, is that to do so requires much information that is not available
until after the leases have been sold. It is very difficult to deter-
mine whether a specific tract will be high-cost or low-cost until the
geological formation has been drilled and the volume and physical prop-
erties of the underlying petroleun ascertained. Although these factors
can be estimated a priori, the variance inherent in such estimates is
-21-
very large. Without reliable information, there really is no basis for
setting or varying the NPS fiscal parameters.
It is also probably true that by setting these parameters differ-
entially across tracts, the government would run the risk of telegraph-
ing to industry, before the sale, something about the government's
internal appraisal of the value of the tract. There is not much danger
in this if government and industry appraisals concur; but if potential
bidders are given the impression that government has undervalued cer-
tain tracts, they may be tempted to bid less than fair market value,
or at least their perception of it.
In conclusion, success of the NPS leasing system relies heavily on
government's ability to fine tune the system and apply its provisions
differentially across tracts. The government, meanwhile, appears
unable or unwilling to administer the program in this fashion. If we
must rely on rigid and uniform profit sharing rules and conventions,
the underlying rationale for the NPS leasing system is weakened con-
siderably.
-22-
FOOTNOTES
In this paper we address the question of whether the NFS leasing
system can be effective in reducing the magnitude of winning bids.
f-Thether that would lead to greater participation by small firms and
increased competition is a separate issue. Frankly, we doubt that
capital barriers have restricted competition in the market for offshore
petroleum leases. Empirical evidence to support our view is discussed
by Smith [1982] .
2
An extensive summary of public comments is provided by the Depart-
ment of Energy [1980], pp. 36785-36793.
Although the bids tendered by individual participants might not, for
strategic reasons, correspond exactly to the expected net present value
of an offered tract (see Reece [1978]), there is a substantial body of
empirical evidence which indicates that the magnitude of winning bids
has on average been quite close to the net present value of offered
tracts (see Mead and Sorenson [1980]).
A third possible effect of the NFS system, though not one of its
stated goals, is to redistribute risk between industry and government.
Although intuition suggests that profit sharing shifts risk from in-
dustry to government, the opposite result can also occur. See Sebenius
and Stan [1982] for an example.
Department of Energy [1980], p. 36785.
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We assume the operator has sufficieat taxable income from other
sources to iraraediately deduct current investment expenditures, even
though the field in question generates no revenues in the first period
when the investment expenditure occurs. The investment expenditures
are deducted in full for tax purposes, rather than being depreciated
over time. We follow this convention because it renders the income tax
regime nondistortive and simplifies the presentation somewhat. However,
the conclusions reported below regarding optimal design of the NPS
leasing system are not dependent on this simplification.
To be clear, the net profit sharing liability is the maximum of
-x(PQ-CQ-fl) and zero. That is, payments do not flow from the govern-
ment to the operator when net income is negative. Consequently, a
simpler form of Equation (2) applies if PQ-CQ-fl < 0.
^Adelraan [1972]
,
p. 50.
In comparing the two lease types , we are assuming the volume of
production from the underlying tract and all associated costs are the
same for both. In fact, production volume and costs for a given tract
may be marginally affected by specific terms of the respective leases.
In as much as the NPS system eliminates distortive royalties, for ex-
ample, it probably increases the value of the tract somewhat. How-
ever, these effects are of second-order importance, so we abstract
from them here.
Since the income tax system is assumed to be neutral, the after-
tax net oresent value of a marginal field is also zero.
--yu-
One extreme is where Che capital recovery factor is set to zero,
in which case the profit sharing system becomes very much like a
straight royalty scheme under which payments are based on gross (not
net) revenues.
""""Department of Energy [1980], p. 36800.
13
These figures are based on tract-specific estimates of recoverable
reserves and exploration and development costs prepared by the U.S.
Geological Survey for the purpose of valuing the leases offered in
Sale 62.
Department of Energy [1979], pp. 62-64.
"""^Department of Energy [1980], pp. 36786-36787.
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